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Regulation and UK Retailing Productivity: 
Evidence from Micro Data
*
 
We use UK micro data to explore whether planning regulation reduced UK retailing 
productivity growth between 1997 and 2003. We document a shift to smaller shops, 
particularly within supermarket chains, following a regulatory change in 1996 which increased 
the costs of opening large stores. This might have caused a slowdown in productivity growth 
if firms (a) lose scale advantages, by moving to smaller stores and (b) lose scope advantages 
if existing organisational knowledge appropriate to larger stores is not perfectly substitutable 
with the organisational capital required to run smaller stores. Our micro data shows a 
relation, controlling for fixed effects, between chain-level TFP for multi-store chains and 
various measures of the size of the stores within the chain. Our results suggest the fall in 
within-chain shop sizes was associated with a lowering of chain TFP by about 0.4% pa, 
about 40% of the post-1995 slowdown in UK retail TFP growth. The foregone productivity 
works out at about £80,000 per small chain supermarket store. 
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1  Introduction 
The speedup in US productivity growth and corresponding slowdown in UK (and EU) productivity 
growth remains an enduring puzzle of major importance to academics and policy-makers alike.  To 
explain this puzzle much attention has been shifted to the retailing and wholesaling sector, which 
appears to account for both a large share of the US speedup and UK slowdown.
1  There are two 
particular facts that have emerged.  First, TFP growth in UK retailing slowed down relative to the 
US.  For example, Basu et al (2003), using as comparable a dataset as possible, find that UK TFP 
growth in retail was 0.38%pa 1990-1995 and -0.58%pa 1995-2000, whilst the US figures were 
0.49%p and 3.23%pa (Tables 4 and 5, based on gross output).  Second, and related, as Blanchard 
(2003) points out, UK labour productivity growth in retailing seems quite reasonable, but TFP 
growth is slow: why then is the capital investment apparently being used so poorly? 
  This paper investigates to what extent planning regulation might be responsible for this poor 
performance in UK retailing.  We believe this question to be of wider interest since planning and 
regulation is cited to be a factor affecting EU retailing productivity growth (Pilat, 1997, McGuckin 
at el, 2005). 
  Our investigations begin with two facts.  First, in 1996 there was a change in retailing 
planning regulations in the UK (Barker Commission, 2006, Competition Commission, 2001, 
Griffith and Harmgart, 2004, Haskel and Sadun, 2005, Sadun, 2008, see also Appendix 1).  This 
change made it much harder for retailers to build large out-of-town stores.  Instead, to try to support 
inner town development, planning permission would only be given for development within cities in 
the first instance and for out-of-town developments only under special circumstances.  Second, after 
this change (which was further reinforced in 1999) there was a remarkable reversal in the 
construction of out-of-town retail development.  The Barker Report (2006) documents that in 1971 
around 65% of new floor space was constructed in town centres.  This fell more or less 
continuously for 25 years to 23% in 1996.  It rose to over 40% in 2003 (see Appendix).  Associated 
with this was a marked change in the strategy of UK supermarket chain stores, documented in 
Griffith and Harmgart (2005).  Before 1996, large UK supermarket chains (who account for almost 
40% of retailing employment) were opening “big box” stores on the outskirts of towns.  Afterwards, 
                                                      
1 For example, in their study of the US TFP acceleration in the late 1990s versus the UK deceleration, Basu, Fernald 
Oulton and Srinivasan (2005) find that the wholesale and retail sectors “account” for about three-quarters of the U.S. 
acceleration in (Domar-weighted industry TFP growth) and one-third of the U.K. deceleration.   
  2UK supermarkets developed and took over inner town small shops
2. The shift towards smaller 
stores is apparent in Figure 1 below which compares the histogram of store sizes in UK national 
supermarket chains (i.e. active in the SIC 521, “Non specialized retail”) in 1997/8 and 2002/3. The 
histogram shows that over the relatively short time period of four years the median size of a store 
belonging to a large supermarket chain has fallen from 75 employees to 56 employees.   
Overall, the timing of the phenomenon and its uniqueness in comparison to other countries, 
suggest that the shift towards smaller stores in the UK retail sector – especially in supermarkets - 
has somehow been driven by the regulatory reforms described above. Although a direct comparison 
is made difficult by the lack of perfectly comparable data
3, the shift towards smaller stores in the 
UK retail sector is remarkably different from happened in countries with different planning policies, 
where retail chains have chosen large store formats to drive their expansion. For example, Jarmin at 
al (2005) document a continuous trend towards larger stores for the retail sector in the US, a country 
where zoning regulation is, at least on average, lighter than most European countries. Even within 
Europe, where planning is typically more regulated, the retail sector has shown a tendency towards 
larger surfaces whenever this was a feasible strategy. A McKinsey report issued in 1998 draws a 
direct link between strict planning regulation and the average size of UK grocery stores. Based on 
in-house data, the report argues that “a typical UK (grocery) store is roughly half the size of a 
typical US store and two thirds the size of a typical French store”
4, and that the differences have 










                                                      
2 Interestingly, not all supermarkets changed their strategy in this direction. For example, ASDA/WalMart who had 
built large stores up to 1996 simply stopped expanding altogether (Griffith and Hamgart, 2005).   
3 Haskel, Jarmin, Motohashi and Sadun (2007) provide a systematic analysis of the retail sector in the UK, US and 
Japan using comparable micro data. The analysis is available only for 1998 and 2002.  
4 The differences with the French retail sector are intriguing, as the French planning system is also highly regulated. 
Differently from the UK case, however, planning policy regulates the number of entrants and not their size.   
5 The report also argues that smaller store size in the UK may depend on the ability of UK retailers to exploit space 
better. 
  3Figure 1: Changes in the Employment Distribution of Small Shops within National Supermarket Chains 
(vertical lines mark the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles of the distribution) 
Note: figures are histograms of shop employment for each shop within a national supermarket chain in 1997/8 (top 
panel) and 2002/3 (bottom panel).  A national chain operates in all 11 UK regions.  SIC521 is “non-specialised stores”, 
mostly supermarkets. Source: ARD data at ONS. 
 
The main question that we want to explore in this paper is whether the shift towards smaller 
stores can explain the disappointing productivity performance of the retail sector over the last 
decade. We assume two potential channels that link average store size and productivity, involving 
economies of scale and scope.  First, if there are (physical) economies of scale
6 in retailing, the 
trend to smaller stores would lower measured productivity levels and, during the switch to smaller 
stores, retard growth.  Second, consider economies of scope.  Suppose that running a chain of stores 
requires “organisational capital” to ensure co-ordination. But suppose further that organisational 
capital is not perfectly substitutable between stores of different sizes.  Thus an existing firm 
characterised by a stock of large stores (as most of UK national retailers where before 1996) forced 
by regulation to open small stores, is less able to use its organisational capital in these new stores.  
                                                      
6 By which we mean “natural” economies arising from, for example, indivisibilities of opening (i.e. it requires a 
minimum staff to open a store and staff the cash tills, Oi, 1981) as opposed to what we shall term scope economies due 
to sharing of managerial expertise and information.  Such information sharing is usually referred to as a scope economy 
e.g. Klette (1996). 
  4This lowers productivity growth as firms adapt their organisational capital to the new profile of 
store
7. 
We use a unique combination of store and firm level information at the micro level drawn 
from the official UK Office of National Statistics business surveys (these are the micro data 
underlying the UK National Accounts) to test our hypotheses about store size and economies of 
scale and scope.  Our main findings are as follows.  First, our micro data shows a consistently 
statistically significant association between firm-level TFP for multi-store chains and various 
measures of the sizes and the size distribution of the stores within the chain.  In particular, we find a 
positive association with the (log) of median size of within-chain shops and, consistent with this, a 
negative association between firm-level TFP and the fraction of shops within the chain that are 
small. The relation is particularly statistically significant in the non-specialised sector (SIC 521), 
which includes supermarkets. This is precisely the sector where, as we show, large chains are 
characterized by very large stores and, thus, is particularly likely to have been affected by the 
change in regulation.  The coefficients suggest that the fall in within-chain shop sizes is associated 
with lowered TFP growth in retailing by 0.2% pa.  This is about 20% of the post-1995 slowdown in 
UK retail TFP growth of about 1% pa documented by Basu et al.  Second, to get some idea of the 
implied valuation of having small shops, we calculate that this TFP represents about £88,000 per 
extra small within-chain supermarket store.
8  A causal link that we think is consistent with our 
results is that the change in planning regulations in 1996 caused chains to open smaller shops, 
which led to smaller TFP. 
The idea that inputs’ heterogeneity might affect productivity is not new: for example, it is 
widely advanced that at least part of SouthWest Airlines’ efficiency is due to having the same type 
of aircraft, or Wal-Mart having one type of “big box” store.  However, we are not aware that this 
idea has been investigated using retail micro data and herein is the main contribution of our paper. 
Our findings are of course correlations in the data, although we do control for fixed effects and we 
do have some preliminary IV estimates.  
In closely related work, Griffith and Harmgart (2005, 2008) have used store-level data on 
the opening of new retail stores from the Institute of Grocery Distribution.  There is, however, no 
productivity information in their data.  In their 2008 paper, they add data individual-level food 
                                                      
7 In the future of course productivity stops falling as firms adjust their organisational capital  to the new profile of small 
stores.  
8 Which of course consumers might be quite willing to pay in return for convenience, assortment etc. 
  5prices to estimate the price effects of regulation via competition. We explain these differences in 
section 4.6. below. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we document the data sources, in section 4 we 
describe the econometric work.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  Data 
2.1  Micro data 
Our empirical analysis is based on micro data on retail firms and stores drawn from the the official 
UK Office of National Statistics business surveys. These are the micro data underlying the UK 
National Accounts. This section describes the main characteristics of the dataset that we employ in 
the econometric section. 
  The UK business data is the Interdepartmental Business Register (the IDBR).  This business 
register is compiled using a combination of tax records on VAT and PAYE, information lodged at 
Companies House, Dun and Bradstreet data and data from other surveys.  The IDBR tries to capture 
two broad measures.  First, it tries to measure the structure of ownership of businesses using three 
aggregation categories: “local units (LUs)”, “enterprises” and “enterprise groups”.  A “local unit” is 
a single mailing address, so this is best thought of as a shop or store.  An “enterprise” is a chain of 
local units/shops under common ownership (e.g. a chain of supermarket stores).  An “enterprise 
group” is a group of enterprises under common ownership (e.g. a chain of both supermarket stores 
and garden centre stores). The second part of data that the IDBR holds is turnover and employment 
data.  This is based mostly on tax data (plus old records from previous inquiries).  Output 
information on the IDBR comes from VAT records if the original source of business information 
was VAT data.  Employment information comes from PAYE data if that is the source of the 
original inclusion.  Thus, if a single-local unit enterprise is large enough to pay VAT ((the threshold 
was £52,000 in 2000/01) it would have turnover information at the enterprise and local unit level.  
On the other hand, if it does not operate a PAYE scheme, it will have no employment information.  
However, employment data is required to construct sampling frames and hence is interpolated from 
turnover data.  For the multi-local unit enterprise, no turnover information will be available for local 
units, since most multi-local unit enterprises do not pay VAT at the local unit level.  If the PAYE 
scheme is operated at the local unit level, it would have independent employment data. 
There are two other ways in which more employment and output data are gathered.  The 
first is if the business is included Annual Register Inquiry (ARI) and the second if it is included in 
  6the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). The ARI is designed to maintain the business structure 
information on the IDBR (Jones, 2000, p.51).  It began in July 1999 and is sent to large enterprises 
(over 100 employees) every year, to enterprises with 20-99 employees every four years and to 
smaller enterprises on an ad hoc basis.  The ARI currently covers around 68,000 enterprises, 
consisting of about 400,000 local units.  It asks each enterprise for employment, industry activity 
and the structure of the enterprise, including having to report employment of its local units. The 
ABI is the official ONS business survey, based on the IDBR, to ask for inputs and outputs and so 
generate value added for the national accounts (the Annual Respondents Database, ARD, consists 
of the panel micro-level information obtained from successive cross-sections of the ABI).  The ABI 
covers production, construction and some service sectors, but not public services, defence and 
agriculture.  The ABI is covered by the Statistics of Trade Act, 1947, and therefore the firms are 
obliged by law to provide data if they get a form.
9  To reduce compliance costs however, the ABI is 
not a Census of all local units.  This is in two regards: aggregation and partial sampling.  Regarding 
aggregation, enterprises normally report on all their LUs jointly.  This is called a “reporting unit” 
(RU) but is typically an enterprise; for convenience we shall call it a chain or firm. Regarding 
sampling, to reduce costs, only reporting units above a certain employment threshold (currently 
250
10) are all sent an ABI form every year.  Smaller reporting units are sampled by size-region-
industry bands.
11   
The questions asked on the ABI for retailing vary somewhat.  Firms are required to provide 
details on turnover (total and broken down in retail and non-retail components, and by commodity 
sold), expenditures (employment costs, total materials and taxes), items defined as work in 
progress, capital expenditures (separately for acquisitions and disposals). They also have to answer 
sections related to import or export of services and on the use of E-Commerce and employment, 
with further data on part-timers.  However, the survey form can be sent in a long or in a short 
format. The main difference between the two types of formats is that in long format firms are 
required to provide a finer detail of the broad sections defined above. For instance, in the long 
format firms break down their disposals and acquisitions information about 20 different items, 
whereas in the short format they only report the aggregate values. Also, in the long format, firms 
                                                      
9 Companies who have to fill out a form can refer to: 
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/business_surveys/abi/default.asp for help and information.   
10 The threshold was lower in the past. See Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2002) for more details. 
11 The employment size bands are 1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, the regions are England and Wales combined, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland.  Within England and Wales industries are stratified at 4 digit level, NI is at two digit 
level and Scotland is at a hybrid 2/3/4 digit level (oversampling in Scotland and NI is by arrangement with local 
executives). See Partington (2001). 
  7answer on questions such as the total number of sites and, on occasion, the amount of squared 
metres they consist of.  Other reported data at the RU level are total employment, wages and input 
costs and investment.  The investment data are used to build up a capital stock database using the 
perpetual inventory method. 
  To summarise, our retailing productivity data consists of ABI data at the chain/firm level, 
which is typically the RU.  However, we do know employment and location information for the 
stores/shops/LUs within the RU.  Thus we can examine how the productivity of the RU relates to 
RU inputs, such as bought in materials, capital etc. but also to the characteristics of its stores (LUs). 
The reporting unit/local unit issue raises a number of measurement issues (econometric issues are 
discussed below).  First, although an enterprise group can in principal consist of a number of lines 
of business, in practice however retailers in an enterprise group tend to report in one reporting unit 
i.e. retailers of food and hardware report in the same reporting unit.
12 Second, many of the larger 
retailers are vertically integrated; supermarkets for example have both their own shops and transport 
facilities (none on our data had food production).  This is coded on the data as follows: the RU will 
have a number of LUs classified to retailing and a number classified to wholesaling.  Thus below 
we measure the fraction of small stores by the fraction of local units classified to retailing only.  In 
our robustness check, we also look at vertical integration and measure vertical integration, 
following Aghion and Griffith (2006), by the fraction of LUs classified to wholesaling. Third, there 
is an issue with takeovers depending on how the shops of the new entity are classified.  As a matter 
of data however, there are in fact rather few takeovers among the big stores in our dataset, the 
takeover wave coming after 2003.
13  Finally, we also note there is a problem with capital stocks.  
Capital stocks are built at the RU level using a perpetual inventory method based on RU-level 
                                                      
12 The median number of RUs per enterprise group was 1 over our data period, with the average slightly above 1. 
13 The details are as follows.  Suppose a multi-store retailer takes over another single store.  The multi-store retailer is 
gathered in one enterprise group and one RU each with their reference numbers, likewise the target store.  After the 
takeover, the target store retains its LU and RU number, but its enterprise group (ENT) number changes to that of the 
acquirer.  The same happens if the target is a chain of n stores: they keep their n LU numbers, their single RU number, 
but the ENT number becomes that of the acquirer.  The exception is if the target is m shops out of a total n, then the m 
shops keep their LU numbers but are absorbed into the RU of the acquirer.  All this has the following consequences.  
We work at reporting unit level and look at the productivity of an RU when its size distribution of LUs changes.  In the 
case when the RU simply builds smaller shops, or acquires shops that were previously a subgroup of a rival RU then 
there is no problem: the LUs within the RU change and the RU aggregates change consistently.  There is a problem 
however if the RU buys all the LUs of a rival RU (or a single RU): then the size composition of the RU does not 
change, nor does the output since the two RUs stay in existence.  Rather the output and size composition of the ENT 
changes.  This suggests that it might be preferable to work at the ENT level to capture the third case.  One problem with 
this is that ENT numbers turn out to be very volatile, whereas the RU numbers are much less so (The ONS does not 
collect the enterprise group numbers independently, rather it relies in information from the Dun and Bradstreet “Who 
owns whom?” dataset.  If this is volatile or is noise is induced by transferring these data to the ABI data this could 
account for the volatility of the ENT reference codes.).  Thus we preferred to work initially at the RU level, although we 
will explore ENT effects in more detail in the robustness checks below. 
  8investment data (no investment data exists at other levels).  If then a firm buys an individual small 
shop this will not show up as investment.  Thus the measured capital stock understates the true level 
after the acquisition (since the new capital in the acquired shop is not added into the capital stock 
term), and since output rises, TFP spuriously increases.  Since in this example the fraction of small 
firms falls, then this bias means we understate (bias towards zero) any true negative relation 
between store size and measured TFP. 
 
2.2  Industry structure 
Table 1 is shows information on the structure of the UK retail sector. Given the heterogeneity of the 
sub-sectors that are classified under Retail (SIC 52), we also provide basic statistics by 3 digit SIC 
industry.  We have 7 industries, with the “non-specialised”, SIC521, covering supermarkets.  The 
descriptions of the industries set out in the table note.  The data show employment for 1997/8 and 
2002/3 (i.e. the average of the start and end years; averages taken to smooth out jumps in the data).  
The largest sectors are in terms of employment are “Non specialized retail” (supermarkets, SIC521) 
and “Other specialized retail” (SIC524), followed by “Food” (SIC522) and “Pharmaceutical” 
(SIC523).  The largest in terms of stores are “Other specialized retail”, “Non specialized retail” and 
“Food”.  The final columns show the 15 firm concentration ratio, with the highest concentration in 
“Non specialized retail” and “Other specialized”.  
 In Table 2 we start exploring the role of within sector firm heterogeneity by dividing the 
sample of stores according to the number of stores they own.  We define three types of retail firms: 
“stand-alone” or “mom and pop” stores which are single owned shops, “small chains” which are 
chains of stores operating in at least nine (out of the UK’s 11) regions and “large chains”, operating 
in all regions.
14. Table 2 shows how shares of employment in different retail chains, left hand panel, 
and share of stores, right hand panel, have evolved over time.  Looking at supermarkets first, the top 
row shows the share of employment has fallen fractionally in stand-alone stores, fallen more in 
small chains and risen in large chains.  The same is true in terms of shops, with a particularly sharp 
fall in the share of stand-alone shops. The general pattern is repeated in all sectors, with the 
exception of Food and Pharmaceutical.  In these sectors the employment share of stand-alone shops 
has fallen only fractionally and the share of large chains has remained flat (in Food) and only risen 
                                                      
14 See Jarmin et al (2005) and Ellickson (2005)  for a similar classification of retail firms.  
  9very slightly in pharmaceuticals
15.  The changes in the shop distribution are also similar, with a 
slightly less pronounced rise in the share of large chains. 
Table 3 shows in more detail how the distribution of shop size within chains has changed, 
using a number of different measures.  All data in this table are for chains, and we distinguish once 
more between small and large chains.   The industries are Supermarkets, Food, Other Retail Stores 
and the final category is the rest of the industries grouped together (due to small sizes).  The first 
column shows the standard deviation of shop sizes.  For small chains, this shows an increase over 
the period in supermarkets and other, a small increase in food and a decline in the grouped 
industries.  For large chains, the change is different: there has been a fall in supermarkets, food and 
the rest but a rise in pharmaceuticals.  The second column of Table 3 shows the fraction of small 
shops in chains.  In devising this measure, there are a number of issues.  The problem here is to 
specify the benchmark for small.  One possibility is to use some percentile point in a base period, 
but this might be regarded as too discrete and the choice of percentile point is to some extent 
arbitrary.  Another issue is that if there is some technological force that is expanding all store sizes 
then benchmarking against a previous point would not account for this: rather, one would want to 
benchmark against a measure like average size in the market.  As it turned out all the measures gave 
rather similar answers, so the number used in this panel is the fraction of shops below the median 
size of the chain in the base period (1997-8).  For large chains the picture is one of a rise in the 
fraction small in supermarkets, regardless of measure, but falls in other industries.  For small chains 




th percentiles of the store distribution.
16  Again, the picture is most pronounced for 
large chains of supermarkets, namely a fall in all sizes at all points in the distribution.  The median 
store size has fallen from employing 72 persons to 57, whilst the size at the 75
th percentile has fallen 
from 141 persons to 117 persons.  For other industries there is much less change.  Median sizes 
have hardly changed at all, although there has been a slight decline in the 75
th percentile for large 
chains.
17   
                                                      
15 Interestingly, the sales of Pharmaceuticals in the UK is regulated. 
16 We can calculate two versions of this statistic.  We can simply take all S stores, regardless of firm, and compute the 
median or other size, giving one measure for all stores.  Or, we can take all stores, allocate them to their firm, and 
calculate a particular percentile, say the median for each of the F firms, and finally take the average of this figure, say 
the median, over the F firms.  This second method is used in the Tables and corresponds to the regression where we 
need a median per firm.  The first method is used to construct the first figure. 
17 As a matter of information, our regression sample is not quite this picture, since with fixed effects we use firms who 
are present in at least two periods.  But the changes are similar, namely a fall in shop sizes for supermarkets and little 
change elsewhere). 
  10  These data suggest that the change to smaller shop sizes within chain store size is largely 
confined to large chains in supermarkets.  Median store sizes in small chains have risen in all 
industries and for large chains in industries other than supermarkets, they are flat.  A number of 
points are worth making on this finding.  First, this is still of interest, since large supermarket chains 
account for a large share of overall retailing activity (37% of value added and 31% of employment). 
Second, technical progress might have been expanding store sizes and hence the change to slightly 
larger stores outside large chain retailing might still be lower than it would otherwise have been.  
Third, it is plausible that the move to inner-town stores only affected size in the non-specialised 
industry.  As Table 3 shows, store sizes in large non-specialised chains are by far and away higher 
than those in other industries (even in large chains).  Thus it is realistic to think that such regulation 
might have been binding on only this industry. 
 
3  Theory  
Our econometric work  examines the correlation between the distribution of store sizes within 
chains and productivity of the chain
18. This section is designed to help the interpretation of this 
correlation.  
Retail chains choose a mix of inputs (capital, labour and material) to produce. We consider a 
store as a specific type of capital, characterised by a location and a dimension (square footage). As 
size and store location tend to be correlated (peripheral areas tends to attract larger stores due to 
land costs) in what follows we introduce the simplification that a store can be fully characterised by 
being small or large. Under this assumption, the production function of a representative retail chain 






it it S S Z f Q , , =                                                           (1) 
 
Where Q represents chain level output, Z are the standard inputs used in production (capital stock 
excluding stores, labour and material) and   are, respectively, the total number of large 
and small stores owned by the firm.  The subscript i denotes chain or firm. The reason for 
considering large and small stores as distinct inputs stems from the fact that, in principle, their 
marginal productivity may differ, i.e.:  
S L S S   and  
                                                      
18 Strictly speaking, since we allow for fixed effects, it will be the change in the distribution and change in productivity. 
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.                                                                 (2) 
 
The literature has provided a number of reasons suggesting that larger stores may indeed be 
associated with higher marginal returns, i.e: 
L QS QS
S ∂ ∂≥ ∂∂. The simplest story is one of 
economies of scale at the store level. As argued by Oi (1998) economies of scale at the store level 
may simply be due to the existence of fixed inputs (labour, parking, advertisement, management 
etc.) which generally characterise the activity of retail stores
19. Oi describes also a second possible 
source of economies of scale, defined as “economies of massed resources”, which arise as a 
combination of consumers effectively entering retailers’ production functions and stochastic 
demand. Economies of scale at the store level may translate into productivity benefits at the firm 
level, at least under the assumption that they are not offset by potential diseconomies at the firm 
level arising from the joint coordination of sets of larger stores. In fact, the literature has 
emphasized that economies of scale at the store level might actually be magnified when considered 
at the firm level, due to potential interactions between sets of large stores and other inputs. Holmes 
(2002) provides a model where large stores arise as an optimal choice due to complementarity with 
new information technologies (bar codes) and integrated distribution networks.  Basker et al (2007) 
describe large stores as an optimal choice in a model where store size is synonymous for breadth of 
product lines offered and consumers are characterised by preferences for “one stop shopping”. In 
their model increasing store size is in a complementary relation with retail chain expansion (number 
of stores) via  fixed costs in what they define “chaining technology”, i.e. the ability of retailers to 
coordinate multiple stores.  
Economies of scope might also account for a connection between store size and firm 
productivity which varies by store size.  Suppose that retail chains have a stock of knowledge or 
organisational capital that affects productivity.  But suppose that some of that organisational capital 
is concerned with running large stores and some with small stores.  It is plausible to assume there 
are economies of scope in such knowledge, but such knowledge may not be perfectly substitutable 
                                                      
19 This is also the line of argument followed by the McKinsey report into the UK grocery sector (1998). They mention 
as fixed or quasi fixed inputs management costs (about 10% of total labour costs) and goods flow (stocking of goods in 
the aisles). 
  12between stores of different sizes.20  This kind of effect is presumably part of the reason why low 
cost airlines like Southwest fly one type of aircraft.   
Given this simple set up, the relationship between store size, regulation and firm level 
productivity can be analysed within a framework of optimal investment choice
21. Consider that case 
of a price-taking 
22 retail firm that maximises its profits deciding in each period the optimal amount 
of inputs and the optimal number of small and large stores it wants to purchase
23. The introduction 
of restrictive planning rules concerning the openings of large retail stores can be seen as an increase 
in the price of large stores as opposed to small stores
24. Everything else equal, planning reform will 
then imply increase in the (shadow) price of opening a large store, and a reduction in investments in 
large stores. Under the assumption that 
L QS QS
S ∂ ∂≥ ∂∂,  this will translate into a lower overall 
firm level TFP.  
The negative effect of regulation on TFP would be even stronger if the production function 
is characterised by complementarities between large stores and other inputs which are costly to 
adjust. For example, a retail chain might have a distribution network based on large trucks, which 
suits a network of large stores in peripheral areas, but it might be extremely difficult to manage with 
smaller stores in town centres. To the extent that the firm cannot change its distribution network 
instantaneously, the move towards smaller stores lowers productivity growth.  The negative effect 
on productivity is in this case a transitory phenomenon, and it will eventually disappear as firms 
adapt their organisational capital to the new profile of stores.   
 
                                                      
20 To make matters concrete, suppose that the knowledge is about the numbers of product lines and delivery 
arrangements which is written in a handbook.  It is plausible that such knowledge is informative across different stores, 
but that the pages describing arrangements for the large stores are not identical to those for small stores.  
21 See for example the basic investment model in Bond and Van Reenen (2003). 
22 The price taking assumption simplifies considerably the model. Beresteanu and Ellickson (2006), Aguirregabiria  et al 
(2006) among others provide models of retailers’ expansion and competition with different strategic settings and 
explicit demand systems.  
23 Expansion can be by building new shops or taking over other shops (the relative price of which depends on the price 
of land and the extent to which knowledge in one firm can be transferred to a brand new shop built within the firm and a 
shop acquired by the firm).   
24 It is in these terms that retailers have described the reform to the Competition Commission (2000). The Barker 
Review (2006) estimates the average cost of a planning application at about £100.000. The Competition Commission 
(2000) documents that the 1996 reform was associated with increased uncertainty in the planning process and 
heightened application costs due to the introduction of the “sequential test” and the “test of need”, i.e. after 1996 
retailers have to prove the need for their new store in the chosen area and the impossibility of opening an alternative 
store in an in town location. 
  134  Econometric work 
4.1  Specification and measurement  
 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that large and small stores enter the production function in the 
following form: 
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where the total number of stores is   and (1+α) is the marginal productivity of large 
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Based on (6), in order to analyse the relationship between store size and measured productivity it 
suffices to obtain measures for S and the share or large stores owned by the retail chain, plus of 
course all the other inputs included in Z.   
  Regarding the total number of stores owned by chain i, these are included in the firm level 
capital stock. To obtain a measure of the share of large stores we have to take a number of steps. 
First, as the ARD does not contain information on the square footage of retail stores, we use 
employment at the store level to approximate for the average size of a store. Second, we need to 
define what we mean for a large store. We proxy for the share of large stores belonging to retail 
chain i using moments drawn from its stores’ distribution. For example, everything else equal, the 
size distribution of the j stores belonging to the chain that opens a new large store will shift to the 
right. Defining  ( ) t i S , φ  as a function that maps moments from the size distribution of stores 
belonging to chain i at time t, i.e  { } t i
N




. ,..., , = , we rewrite (6) as: 
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  14The main measures that we use are median store employment and – symmetrically - the fraction of 
stores that are below the median observed at the beginning at the sample. We also experiment with 
higher moments of the store distribution, using the coefficient of variation and the interquartile 
range. 
  Second, we specify the Z and Q variables in (7), as the usual production function arguments 
of chain-level capital, employment and material use, with Q being gross output.  There are clearly a 
number of issues here.  First, the measurement of retail output and estimation of relevant input 
elasticities raises a set of conceptual issues that are discussed in Appendix 2.  Here we follow a 
standard gross output production function approach with fixed effects to try to control for as many 
unobservables as possible.  Second, a measure of capital here is build up via the perpetual inventory 
method using data on investment in plant, buildings and machinery.  This does not by any means 
measure capital in the firm since much of the effective retailing capital stock is due to factors like, 
for example, floor area.  In addition, the investment data is at the firm level and not the shop level 
so that the acquisition of shops will not show up as investment.  Thus from the point of view of 
measurement, it is perfectly possible that our shop size variables are picking up aspects of the 
mismeasured capital stock, rather than the organisational capital stock.  It could be argued however 
that this may not matter very much since we will be unable to distinguish between conventional and 
physical capital in any case. 
  Third, as noted above, Betancourt (2004) has argued that sales of a retail store are affected 
by distribution services such as ambience, product assortment, accessibility of location, assurance 
of delivery and information.  Like other studies, we do not have detailed measures of these factor 
and so proceed as follows.  First, we include regional and industry dummies to control for any 
common regional and industry level of distribution services.   Thus for example, we do not compare 
food retailers with second-hand car dealers but compare within 4-digit industries.  Second, we enter 
a dummy for whether the shop is part of a national chain or not, which should additionally control 
for ambience-type effects.  Third, we also enter fixed firm effects so that we are comparing changes 
in sales, controlling for other things, rather than levels: to the extent that factors such as ambience 
and location convenience remain fixed, this should be controlled for.  See Appendix 2 for a detailed 
discussion. 
 
  154.2  Econometrics 
Given the steps described above, and a standard Cobb-Douglas assumption on the production 
function
25, we end up estimating a log linear equation of the following form for firm i: 
 
() it R I T i it t i








ln ln            (8) 
 
With a panel of data we shall estimate (8) by OLS and OLS with fixed effects.  The econometric 
issues involved are discussed in, for example, Griliches and Mairesse (1986).  A number of points 
are worth making.  First, our primary focus is γ
S, the coefficient on φ.  If regulation determines φ   
and if such regulation is orthogonal to firm characteristics then the estimated γ
S is unbiased.  If, 
however, this orthogonality condition fails, the coefficient on φ will be biased. Consider the case 
where better managers both raise productivity and employment, a partial explanation as to why 
large firms are more productive.  This would tend to make OLS estimates of productivity and store 
size overstated. On the other hand, if better managers are needed to run chains with different mixes 
of stores, OLS would understate the relation between productivity and store size and overstate 
between the relationship between productivity and store dispersion
  26. To control for this type of 
biases we use fixed effects, thus the impact of φ  will be biased only if changes in unobserved 
managerial skill cause both changes in φ and changes in TFP. 
Second, unbiased estimation of the effect of input quantities comes from exogenous factors 
that cause them to vary, usually taken to be factor prices.  Such factor prices are not available and 
indeed constructing them would be hard since the chain data is aggregated employment over a 
number of different locations.  An alternative is to use lagged quantities as instruments, but in a 
fixed effect regression over a short period such lags are unlikely to be powerful instruments.  Since 
the estimation of these parameters is not our central concern we do not pursue this issue here.
27 
  Third, we do not have firm-specific output or input prices, rather four-digit industry prices.  
The consequences of this for production function estimation are explored in e.g. Klette and 
Griliches (1996) who point out that omission of firm-specific output prices, under the assumption 
                                                      
25 We also exploit the fact that ln(1+x)≈ln(x). Note that the total number of stores is included in the capital stock K and 
that the specification abstract from possible complementarities between the share of large stores and other inputs.  
26 There is likely measurement error in the reporting of store employment as well.  If it is classical then that would 
potentially bias the effect toward zero.  Whether it is classical is not clear however, since we might assume that 
measurement error is greater the more stores that a firm has and the more new stores a firm opens (since to some extent 
the ONS checking procedures and forms are based on previously recorded store numbers).   
27 Still another alternative is of course to use an Olley-Pakes (1984) type procedure but this relies on particularly strong 
identification assumptions, see e.g. Bond and Soderbon (2005) and the discussion in Hellerstein and Neumark (2005). 
  16that demand is Dixit-Stiglitz introduces a term in (pi-pI) in the error term, so that cross-sectional 
comparisons of TFP reflect both differences in technology but also prices deviations.  Similarly, if 
there input prices are firm-specific then the error term also contains a term in -γ
Z(pi
Z-pI
Z) for the 
Z’th input.  Thus cross-sectional comparisons of TFP reflect also the ability of firms to source 
inputs cheaper than others (such firms will have higher measured TFP).  This is then another reason 
to include fixed effects.  Thus the γs are biased to the extent that deviations in within-firm scale 
measures from the mean are correlated with deviations of output prices net of input-elasticity 
weighted deviations of input prices. 
The direction or magnitude of this bias is not clear.  In the levels, it seems reasonable to 
assume that larger firms can source cheaper inputs, giving them higher measured TFP.  Since this 




Z).  Thus any effect of median size (as an example of an φ measure) on 
measured TFP would be biased upwards if firms with rising median sizes were achieving higher 
input price gaps.  We might imagine that more monopolistic firms would be able to achieve higher 
input price gaps, and that this might be more likely in large firms.  However, large firms have had 
falls in median store size, which would induce a negative correlation between median size and price 
gaps, which would imply our effects are understatements of the true effect. 
  Fourth, a related effect due to lack of firm-specific prices comes about with product mix.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that smaller stores in large chains often carry different (high value) 
product mixes and do not feature special offers in the way that large stores do.  Suppose then that 
large stores offer both high and low price baskets of goods but that only large stores feature 
discounts.  Thus, in obvious notation the large stores are offering a basket with value BL=PH(1-
s)QH+PLQL whereas the smaller stores offer a basket BS= PHQH.  Denote the number of stores in a 
chain as N, with ν the fraction of small stores, in which case the firm level basket, which is what we 
measure is BF=N((1-ν)BL+νBS).  Thus in the cross-section there will be a correlation between the 
fraction of small stores and the revenues from full price high-margin goods.  If these revenues are 
higher
28 then chains with more small stores would have higher measured output.  This works in the 
opposite direction to what we have found. 
  Fifth, aggregation.  As discussed, our data is at chain or firm level.  We postulate a log-
linear relation between firm-level outputs and inputs, and within-firm measures of input 
                                                      
28 It would seem reasonable that they are higher i.e. the demand at these stores is sufficiently inelastic so revenue is 
large even with the lack of sale prices, since this would cover higher land rents at such stores who are e.g. in centres of 
town, or in stations and airports where presumably space is priced at a premium. 
  17distributions.  However, by definition, the log of chain-level output or input, which is the log of the 
sum of outputs or inputs is not the same as the sum of the logs of outputs or inputs.  Thus we have 
to be careful that the within-firm measures do not appear just due to aggregation.  To examine this 
we proceed as follows.  Consider a simple case where each shop j within a chain has a Cobb-
Douglas relation of the form Qj=Nj
αKj
β.  We only observe Qi=Σj Qj, Ki=Σj Kj, Ni=Σj Nj but for each 
chain i we do observe the Njs ∀ j∈i.  Let us start by assuming that Q, Y and N are log- normally 
distributed within the firm.  Making use of the relation that for a log-normally distributed variable 




logX is the standard deviation of logX, we can write the 
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This shows that the relation between observed log firm output and observed log firm inputs in (8) 
has an extra term in it, namely the within-firm variance of log output net of the sum of the output 
elasticity weighted within-firm variances of log inputs.  Thus (9) shows that the use of logs does 
indeed induce a relation between log output and within-firm input distributions.  It is important to 
note however, that the induced term is not, even in this simple case, a simple dispersion measure of 
one of the inputs, such as the median or standard deviation, but is rather the gap between the 
dispersion of output and the (weighted) sum of dispersion of inputs.  Thus the question is: to what 
extent might our postulated relation between chain log output and within-chain store size dispersion 
simply arise due to aggregation? 
The bias to γ
S depends upon the correlation between this and the gap term (with fixed effects, 
strictly between changes in γ
S and changes in the gap).  Even in levels, it is not clear whether this 
correlation is positive or negative.  Unobservably good firms, who might have high φ, for example, 
might have a positive or negative gap.  The reason is the gap depends on whether (unobservably) 
better managers are better able to affect output variation net of input variation.  One view would be 
that good firms keep, for given input variation, output variation low, since customers might dislike 
  18output variation.  Or it might be that good firms keep input variation low (e.g. managing 
absenteeism) and so the gap is positive.  Given this uncertainty, it would seem even harder to sign 
the correlation in the differences.
29   
 
4.3  Results 
Table 4 sets out our results.  Since we focus on the impact of the within-firm size distribution, we 
use only multi-store firms in this table.  Thus the first column sets out a regression of output on the 
standard inputs with a dummy for whether the firm is a national chain or not (the omitted category 
is a regional chain) on 7,469 firms.  The sum of the coefficients on the conventional inputs (0.982) 
indicates decreasing returns and the national chain dummy indicates a (statistically insignificant) 
positive TFP advantage to being a national chain.  To help interpret these numbers, column 2 shows 
a fixed effects regression (on the same sample of firms).  Here the coefficients on the inputs are 
reduced somewhat (except for LnN) and the national chain dummy indicates a (statistically 
significant) positive TFP advantage, relative to regional chains, of about 7%.   
  The fall in the input coefficients, particularly of capital, are in line with the well-known 
exacerbation of measurement error with fixed effects and might therefore suggest that we should 
not use the fixed effect specification.  However, there are presumably a host of unobserved 
distribution services and thus it would seem preferable to include the fixed effects since the 
distribution services offered in shops is so hard to control for. 
  In the next columns then, we consider within-firm employment measures with fixed effects. 
Column 3 adds log median size, which is positive and significant, suggesting that a 1% reduction in 
median store size is associated with 0.0261% decrease in productivity.  Column 4 and 5 add the 
share of small stores in the firm by number and employment respectively, both of which are 
significantly negative (respectively -0.0712 and -0.0669), suggesting that an increase in the number 
                                                      
29 As a matter of data, we only have within-firm data on N and so can only investigate the correlation between log 
median shop size for each firm and σ
2
logN (the variance of shop sizes within firms).  This is 0.20, significant at the 1% 
level.  Finally, note this equation above is derived when the inputs are log linear and the output elasticities in the store-
level production function do not vary across stores in a chain.  In the more general case, one still obtains a relation 
being the gap between the dispersion of output and the output-elasticity weighted dispersion of inputs.  In the constant 
output elasticity case with just one input X Albuquerque (2003) shows the equivalent of the last term on the right-hand 
side of (9) to be  () ( ) i LL γ − YX  where  () l n (/) LY Y = Y   where Y  and Y  equal the arithmetic mean and 
geometric mean of Yi across the stores within the chain j respectively and similarly for X, and γ is the output elasticity 
of X.  In the case of the log-normal distribution the relation between the arithmetic and geometric mean implies the 
expression becomes that in (9).  See Alburquerque (2003, expression (4)) for an expansion of this with more factors the 
term involves additional output-elasticity weighted terms, and with varying γs across stores within a chain, additional 
terms in the covariance of the log level of inputs (relative to the chain average) and the store-specific γ (relative to the 
chain average).  These aggregation results are also consistent with Lewbel (1992) results on scale-invariance. 

  19of stores below the beginning of period median is associated with lower overall firm productivity.  
The next two rows show similar effects, whilst controlling too for median size.  The final columns 
look at the effect of dispersion in within-chain store sizes, controlling for median store size.  The 
dispersion measures are the coefficient of variation of within-firm store size and the (log) of the 
IQR, both of which are positive, but statistically insignificant.   
  All this suggests that, controlling for overall firm size, fixed effects and other inputs, within-
firm store sizes have a statistically significant association with firm productivity.  Firms with 
smaller within-firm store sizes (measured either as median size or fraction of small firms) are 
associated with lower productivity.  
To explore the role of industry heterogeneity, we run separate regressions for each three-
digit SIC.  This also enables us to decompose better the effects on productivity given that the share 
of small firms has changed slightly differently across sectors.  It is worth noting however sectors 
521, 522 and 524 are the biggest subsectors in terms of employment and so we amalgamated the 
remaining sectors due to small sample problems. The top row of Table 5 reports the coefficient on 
log median store size for each 3 digit sector (all other regressors are not reported).  The second and 
third rows report coefficients on the fraction of small shops using measures by employment and 
number of stores respectively.  The table suggests that the results are mainly driven by  “Non 
specialised retail” (SIC521) and “Other specialised retail” (SIC524, this subsector excludes retail of 
Food and Pharmaceutical goods), which together represent 86% of total retail employment and 92% 
of total retail value added. For supermarkets (SIC521), there is a strong positive effect from median 
size, with no significant effect from the fraction of small shops.  For “Specialised Retail” (SIC524), 
there is also a strong positive effect from median size, and a negative effect from the fraction of 
small shops. The other sectors have no particularly statistically significant effect.   
 
4.4  Robustness checks and IV 
  Finally, we return to the overall table and in Table 6 we set out some robustness checks on 
the sample of Table 1.  Column 1 and 2 repeat, for convenience, the benchmark specification from 
Table 5 for, respectively, median store employment and percentages of small stores.  We next 
consider robustness.  First, it might be that our results capture some unobserved effects due to the 
distribution network of retail chains, i.e. vertically integrated firms have higher TFP and larger 
  20stores
30. To explore this potential source of bias, in columns 3 and 4 we run the baseline regression 
controlling for vertical integration using a dummy which takes value 1 if the firm’s main sic code is 
Retail (SIC 52), but some of its establishments (local units) are classified in Wholesale (SIC 51), or 
if the firm belongs to a larger enterprise group which owns other firms whose main SIC code is 
Wholesale
31. The coefficient on the vertical integration variable is positive and significant, but so 
are the coefficients on our size variables, which remain virtually unchanged.  Second, in columns 5 
and 6 we explore the idea that the complementarity between larger stores and vertical integration 
might drive our main result, but we do not find support for this hypothesis.  Finally, we entered 
transport costs (ln_T) separately to input costs.  This is to test whether the small shops effect is just 
a reflection of the notion that serving more small stores involves more transport and, to the extent, 
that there might be congestion involved, lower productivity.  In the data, the fraction of transport 
costs are positively correlated with the fraction of small stores, but the regression table shows that 
the coefficient on small stores is hardly altered. 
  In a final check we tried an IV type approach to the basic specification of Table 4, column 3, 
i.e. fixed effects with log median size, where we used initial median size as an instrument for 
subsequent median size (since we control for fixed effects, this effectively uses initial median size 
as an instrument for subsequent changes in median size, where initial median size is measured as 
the median size of the shops within the chain in the first period the chain is observed and the sample 
is all observations excluding the first period the chain is observed).  The rationale behind the 
instrument is that the response to the exogenous change in planning regulation (which raised the 
cost of opening larger shops) might have differed according to the stores distribution that firms had 
in the pre-regulatory environment. For example, firms with initially larger stores might have faced 
higher adjustment costs in changing stores’ distribution (i.e. opening smaller stores) in subsequent 
periods. This is consistent with the evidence that “big-box” retailers such as ASDA/WalMart had 
significant problems in adjusting their store strategies to the new planning regime after the 1996 
reform (Competition Commission, 2000, Griffith and Harmgart, 2005).  An immediate test is 
whether the instrument is correlated with subsequent changes in median store sizes i.e. the first 
stage F test prescribed by Stock and Staiger (1998). The coefficient is -0.0006 (significant at the 1% 
level), suggesting that, indeed, firms with larger stores in the initial period experienced smaller 
                                                      
30 See Holmes (2002) for a model where vertical integration and large stores arise as optimal complementary choices 
with the introduction of IT. 
31 The results are robust if we use only the first part of the definition, i.e. a firm is vertically integrated if its main SIC 
code is Retail (SIC 52) but some of its establishments are classified in Wholesale (SIC 51). 
 
  21changes in stores size. The F statistic in the first stage regression if 36, which is well beyond the 
Stock and Yogo threshold of 16.
32 
  The sample generated from this exercise was 2,353 firms, which yielded an LSDV 
coefficient of 0.013 (se=0.014) on log median size.  The IV result was 0.144 (se=0.06), both larger 
than the OLS and more precisely estimated.  Thus the IV estimate is much large than this or the 
OLS or LSDV estimates in Table 3, 4 and 5. What is the interpretation of the higher IV coefficient 
relative to the OLS/LSDV coefficient?  Discounting the bias from weak instruments, it could be 
first that IV is upward biased due to a correlation between the instrument and unobservables that 
was exacerbated by using IV relative to OLS/LSDV.  To explain the higher upward bias relative to 
OLS it would have to be that initial size has a higher correlation with omitted factors affecting 
changes in productivity and median store size than the OLS/LSDV bias due to the correlation 
between omitted factors affecting productivity and median store size.  A second possibility is that 
IV is unbiased, but OLS/LSDV is downward biased due to endogeneity, due to a negative 
correlation between omitted factors causing chain productivity and median store size.  Here it 
would have to be that better managers chose to open smaller stores, which seems the reverse of 
what is usually argued.  Third, OLS/LSDV might be downward biased due to measurement error in 
the changes in median store size that is corrected by instrumenting with initial store size.  It is quite 
likely that within-firm employment is misreported, although without explicit checking of the data 
against published records (which we cannot do due to confidentiality), the extent of this is hard to 
know.  We do however know that changes in mismeasured variables amplify the measurement error 
bias and hence the initial level of median store size might be a better variable for this reason.  
Finally, it is possible that there are heterogeneous coefficients and that IV has identified the local 
marginal effect arising from initially big firms, for whom there might have been a very severe 
penalty to becoming small.  For all these reasons, our OLS results may be an understatements of the 
causal effects of the move to smaller within-chain store sizes due to regulation. 
  Finally, as mentioned above, we do not have data on IT (separately from other K terms).  It 
is quite possible that the mix of store sizes in φ is correlated with IT, where more IT is needed to co-
                                                      
32  The instrument might however be invalid if it is correlated with any unobservables that affect also affect changes in 
productivity and changes in store sizes.  Thus suppose for example, that chains with initially high median store sizes 
have unobservably better management throughout the period.  If better managers affect both subsequent productivity 
growth (not levels) and changing store sizes then the instrument might be capturing this effect and not a causal link 
between changing store sizes and productivity growth.  One possibility is that there is no relation between initial 
management and subsequent changes since management itself might change.  Otherwise predicting the relation between 
initial management and subsequent changes is not clear; better managers might be good or bad change managers for 
example.   
  22ordinate more large and small stores.  In this case, were we to measure IT at store level (these data 
are not collected by the ONS) then there would be no effect on TFP and the measured slowdown 
would be illusory.  However, much recent work on IT and productivity suggests IT alone is not 
sufficient to account for productivity, rather complementary organisational structures are required 
(see e.g. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).  To the extent that store sizes controls for such 
complementarity organisational structure, then size would affect TFP even with IT data. 
 
4.5  Economic significance of results 
We believe there is some support for a statistically significant association between productivity and 
various measures of the presence of small shops in a chain of stores.  To judge the economic 
significance of this we proceed in Table 7 to consider the effect of changes in median employment.  
The columns in Table 7 show the results for the four industries named in row 1 and for the 
total sectors, where the total sector results are the employment-weighted numbers using the 
employment weights in row 2.  Row 3 shows TFP growth for each firm by using the change in log 
output less the cost-share weighted change in log input,
33 weighted the fraction of employment in 
the firm in the relevant SIC for each year.  The figures in row 3 are the sums of this for each SIC 
and the total column the weighted sum (of each number in row 3, weighted by the industry 
employment shares in row 2).
34  Row 3 shows TFP growth rates of -0.28%pa in supermarkets, 
0.10%pa in food, 0.56% pa in pharmaceutical and 0.84% pa in the rest.  The overall productivity 
growth rate for retailing is, on our sample, 0.07%. 
Before passing to other calculations, how do these data compare with other TFP estimates? 
First, these are TFP calculated from gross output, which is always lower than that calculated from 
value added (Domar, 1963).  Basu et al (2003) report UK gross output industry level TFP growth 
rates, 1995-2000 for retail trade, of -0.58% (Table 5, note +3.23% for the US).  For 1995-2002, 
+0.24% in Timmer and Inklaar (2005, Table 6, note 0.41% for the US).  Second, our growth rates 
are calculated for our sample of chains and thus omit small shops (as we show below however, 
chains account for 96% of value added in retailing).  Third, the chains in the sample had to survive 
at least two periods to be included in the sample. Thus it misses, to some extent, the industry 
                                                      
33 The factor cost shares were for employment the share of gross output accounted for by labour costs, for materials the 
share accounted for by purchases of materials and for capital the remaining share.  An alternative is to use the implied 
output elasticities from the regressions instead of the factor cost shares.  In the light of the possible biases to the 
elasticities we used the actual factor cost shares which also eases comparison with aggregate figures. 
34 Strictly speaking the TFP growth rates should be Domar weighted but we ignore this here: there are few sales by each 
retailer to the other and employment is somewhat better measured than output.  
  23productivity gains from entry and exit of new firms and so might be expected to be below the 
industry data.  Note finally that it is of interest that the sector with the fall in the median store size 
has had the lowest TFP growth.   
  Returning to Table 7, row 4 shows the coefficient on log median employment size from the 
earlier regression.  Rows 5 and 6 show the median employment in each industry for our sample in 
1997/8 and 2002/3.  As we saw in Table 3 above (for the full sample) in the regression sample 
median employment has fallen in “Supermarkets” and risen slightly elsewhere.  The seventh row 
shows the predicted effect from the actual change times the coefficient.  In supermarkets, the 
predicted effect is to lower annual ΔlnTFP by 0.64% per year.  In SIC524 and “Rest (524)” the 
effect is to raise it by 0.55% per year and the effect is small and negative in SIC522 (due to the 
negative coefficient in Table 5).  
  The final two rows set out two counterfactuals.  Row 8 imagines there was no reduction in 
median store size in supermarkets (but other sectors were unaffected).  Given the supermarkets are 
so much larger than other industries, this seems to be the counter-factual of immediate interest, 
since it is likely that only for supermarkets would store size regulation be binding, but for 
completeness, row 9 shows no change in any median store size in all industries.  Comparing rows 8 
and 9 with the actual case in row 2, in row 8, TFP growth is raised in supermarkets (by the amount 
in row 7) and unaffected elsewhere and in row 9 it is raised in supermarkets, but slightly lowered 
elsewhere.  At the same employment weights, the overall effect is to raise overall TFP growth from 
0.07%pa to 0.44% pa and 0.27% pa.  
  The following points are worth noting.  First, in the second scenario, even though 
productivity growth falls for the non-supermarket sectors, supermarkets are large enough that 
overall productivity growth still rises.  Note however, that because median store sizes rose in 
“Pharmaceuticals” and “Rest” keeping median store sizes at their initial level lowers TFP growth in 
these sector in the second counterfactual case, where median store sizes do not change in any 
industry. 
  Second, what might this tell us about the effect of planning regulations in UK retailing 
productivity growth?  The Basu et al (2003) data shows UK retail trade gross output productivity 
growth slowing from 0.38% pa 1990-95 to -0.58%pa 1995-2000, a slowdown of 0.96 percentage 
points per annum (pppa).  Let us assume, for the purposes of this illustrative calculation, that 
planning has caused a move to small stores and we have indentified the causal effects of planning 
on store sizes.  Our results suggest that in the absence of changes in store sizes in supermarkets only 
productivity growth would have been 0.44% pa rather than the actual 0.07% pa (see the total 
  24columns in row 3 and row 9).  Thus we estimate an implied slowdown due to changes in store sizes 
of (0.27-0.07)=0.37 pppa.  This is about 39% (0.37/0.96) of the Basu et al slowdown.
35  Note too 
(Basu et al, footnote 15) that UK retailing by itself accounts for 1/3
rd of the UK (private sector) 
economy-wide TFP deceleration.  Thus we estimate that regulation in retailing accounts for 13% 
(1/3
rd of 39%) of the economy-wide deceleration. 
  Finally, it is important to note that this is an effect on measured productivity and not 
welfare.  So, for example, it is perfectly possible that consumers are happy to pay for such changes 
due to increased convenience and the like. 
4.6  The cost of regulation 
The above data suggest the TFP slowdown is associated with retail chains moving toward small 
store formats.  It could of course be that consumers value small stores.  Hence a calculation of 
interest is to work out the implied cost sacrifice (due to reduced TFP) per small shop that has been 
created.  Our discussion above suggested that regulation was likely most binding on the non-
specialised (supermarket) sector, so we shall calculate the implied regulation effect for this sector.   
  Our regressions suggest that the movement to smaller median stores has slowed TFP growth 
by 0.64%pa in supermarkets (i.e. the difference between actual TFP growth and what TFP growth 
would have been with no move to smaller stores, row 9 less row 3 in Table 7.  Thus one way of 
thinking about the counter-factual situation where there is no regulation is as follows.  Total value 
added in supermarkets was £20,790bn, with chains accounting for 99% of it.  Thus in the 
counterfactual situations, had there been no TFP slowdown, chains would have been able to 
produce £132m more per year (£20bn*0.99*0.64%). 
  We can express this foregone production in terms of the additional small chain stores 
created during the time period under consideration. In 1997/8 there were 1,359 small stores 
affiliated to national supermarket chains and in 2002/3, 2,859. This corresponds to a a rise in 1,500 
small chain stores.
36 Therefore, the extra cost associated with each new small chain store has been 
£132m/1,500=£88,000 per store.  There are a number of points worth making regarding these 
                                                      
35 Another way to think of our data is relative to the US, although the counter-factual is not as clear without knowing 
what happened in the US to store sizes for large chains in supermarkets.  The Basu et al and Timmer and Inklaar 
suggests that US retail TFP growth is about 7 times and 2 times respectively that in the UK. Our data here suggests that 
were there to be have been no change in median shop sizes, UK TFP growth would have been about 3 times greater.  
This then overexplains the Timmer/Inklaar figures, but is about 40% of the Basu at all figures. 
36 Table 1 shows in base period, 14,853 shops in SIC521, from table 2, 15% of those shops were in large chains, which 
is 2, 228 stores.  From Table 3, 61% of these shops were below the median size of large chain stores in the base period, 
which is 1,359.  By 2002/3 there were 2,859 small stores within national supermarket chains (using the analogous 
tables, this is from 18,552 total shops, of which 23% in large chains, of which 67% are small). 
  25calculations.  First, the counterfactual assumes that extra output is “freely” available, that is, that 
any extra output requires no inputs to produce it.  In this context, this may not be too bad an 
assumption, since one way of thinking about the TFP here is the organisational capital in running 
large stores.  If this is already existing in current large stores and can be applied to those stores that 
would have been large in the counterfactual then the assumption it is freely available would hold.  
Second, the counterfactual benefit above assumes that the current amount of GDP could have been 
produced at lower cost by 0.64%, thus raising potential returns to workers and capital at given 
prices.  If markets are competitive then prices will fall raising consumer surplus by this amount but 
also by the Harberger triangle, suggesting this is an understatement of the welfare loss (we would 
need a complete model of consumer demand in big and small store to undertake a full welfare 
calculation). 
How does this work relate to Griffith and Harmgart (2008)?.  First, they set out a model 
predicting the probability of a more or less monopolised market structure, crucially, taking account 
of individual preferences (e.g. for convenience stores).  Second, they estimate a model predicting 
the probability of having zero, one, two etc. stores in a market, separately for large and small stores, 
see their table 6.  They find that (p.23), controlling for other effects, if more planning applications 
had been approved, the resulting market equilibrium would have had more stores, with their 
strongest (in significance) marginal effects resulting in more large stores (see table 6, column 2 and 
table 7, column 1 and 2.   
Third, they estimate a model linking the price at supermarkets with the local market 
presence of single supermarket, duopoly etc).  They then simulate the effect on prices of a 
relaxation in planning regulations via the increase in the probability of a local consumer facing 
more supermarkets in the area.  They find that (p.24) prices would have been lower by about 0.03% 
of weekly spend (table 17, last row) which is £12m per year. 
How does these findings compare to ours, in particular our supply side calculations of a loss 
of economies of scale/scope of £132m?  First, the counter-factual that we estimate is very different.  
We estimate a return to the 1997/8 size profile of stores.  They estimate a change in market 
structure due to lifting of all planning regulations.  Their results suggest there would have been 
more large stores, so the counterfactuals are related, but not the same.  (It is worth noting that they 
find a positive relation between denying planning applications and the probability of having local 
market structures with fewer large stores, see their table 2, they also find a (statistically 
insignificant) relation between denying planning applications and the probability of having local 
market structures with more small stores; so this latter finding is in line with the shift to more small 
  26stores that we are postulating, although on our data we are unable to make any statements about the 
local markets where this effect might be concentrated).  
Second, as mentioned above, their raw data shows an increase in openings of small 
supermarket stores after regulation (see their figure 1).  But our number is for a trend towards 
smaller stores, which we assert is correlated with changes in regulation.  If part of that trend simply 
reflects changes in e.g. demand for convenience stores, which Griffith and Harmgart control for, 
then we have overstated the effects of regulation on the trend to smaller stores relative to them.  
  Third, the mechanism by which planning affects real outcomes is very different in these 
studies.  The Griffith/Harmgart effect comes about from changes in price-setting from less 
competition due to the restricted entry of (statistically the most important effect) large stores.  Our 
effect comes from changes in supply due to the shift to small stores.  Since our data are on 
revenues, our effect is from changes in both prices and quantities following the shift to smaller 
stores, which could be larger than the shift to prices.  Finally, we might have correctly estimated the 
changes in costs, but due to incomplete pass-though this is of course perfectly consistent with a 
smaller change in prices. 
37  
 
5  Conclusion 
 
We have used UK micro data to explore whether tightened regulation might have been associated 
with the reduction in UK retailing productivity growth 1997-2003.  We document a shift to smaller 
shops following a regulatory change in 1996.  This might have caused a slowdown in productivity 
growth if firms (a) lose scale advantages, by moving to smaller stores and (b) lose scope advantages 
if existing organisational resources appropriate to larger stores are not perfectly substitutable with 
the organisational capital required to run smaller stores.  Our micro data shows a positive relation 
between firm-level TFP for multi-store chains and large store formats, using various measures of 
the sizes and the size distribution of the stores within the chain.  Our results suggest the fall in shop 
sizes is associated with lowered TFP growth by about 0.4% pa, about 40% of the post-1995 
slowdown in UK retail TFP growth.  Given that the slowdown in retailing alone is about 1/3
rd of the 
entire slowdown in UK market sector TFP growth, this is about 13% of that entire market sector 
slowdown.  It is also around £88,000 per small chain store created. 
                                                      
37 The degree of pass-through depends critically on assumptions about demand e.g. for straight line demand curves it is 
50%, but could be any number, see Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983). 
  27We believe our results suggest a robust correlation between average store size and retailers’ 
measured productivity.  In future work it might be interesting to pursue a number of other avenues. 
First, measured productivity reflects a number of different effects such as assortment, convenience 
etc. for which consumers might be quite happy to pay.  Second, we have postulated a link between 
changes in regulation and store size: this the subject of another paper, Sadun (2008), but more 
exploration of this is clearly needed.  Third, it would be of interest to explore other countries.  
Finally, more data would help us better understand the reason for this correlation. As we have 
indicated  simple explanation might be that the correlation is generated by pure economies of scale 
at the store level. A more complex channel involves complementarities between store size, shared 
information across stores and other inputs for example, IT investments. Without store level IT data, 
answering this final question may be better suited to private data sets.   
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1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003
521 Supermarkets 876,905 1,100,000 14,853 18,552 43.2% 45.0%
522 Food, Bev, Tob 94,692 78,763 13,266 10,957 2.9% 2.0%
523 Pharmaceutical 70,483 65,324 6,975 7,031 3.2% 2.4%
524 Other  521,455 705,689 48,455 53,369 10.5% 13.2%
525 Second-hand 2,917 3,878 819 1,469 0.1% 0.1%
526 Not in store 49,016 43,838 1,100 835 2.5% 1.8%
527 Repair 4,340 6,691 953 958 0.2% 0.3%
Total employment Stores Cr 15
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS BY THREE-DIGIT INSUSTRY
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from ARD. 
Notes: full descriptions of SICs are as follows: 
SIC Industry  Notes 
521  Retail sales in non-spec covering e.g. food, 
beverages or tobacco  
Includes supermarkets and department stores  
522  Food, beverages, tobacco in specialised 
stores 
 
523  Pharm and medical goods, cosmetic and 
toilet articles 
Includes chemists  
524  Other retail sales of new goods in 
specialised stores  
Includes sales of textiles, clothing, shoes, furniture, elect appliances, hardware, books, 
newspapers and stationary, cameras, office supplies, computers. Clothing is biggest area  
525  Second-hand  Mostly second-hand books, second-hand goods and antiques  
526  Not in stores  Mostly mail order and stalls and markets  
527  Repair  Repair of personal goods, boots and shoes, watches and clocks  
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1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003
Supermarkets 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.18 0.63 0.70 0.72 0.66 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.23
Food, Bev, Tob 0.62 0.60 0.28 0.29 0.11 0.11 0.79 0.76 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.07
Pharmaceutical 0.33 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.30
Other  0.36 0.33 0.25 0.21 0.40 0.46 0.61 0.62 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.20
Second-hand 0.85 0.79 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.88 0.79 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.12
Not in store 0.42 0.50 0.47 0.30 0.11 0.20 0.89 0.94 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02
Repair 0.74 0.75 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.80 0.87 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.09
TABLE 2. SHARE OF EMPLOYMENT IN STAND ALONE STORES, SMALL AND LARGE CHAINS
Store Shares
Stand Alone Shops Small Chains Large Chains Stand Alone Shops Small Chains Large Chains
Employment Shares
  
Notes:  Stand-alone are single stores.  Small Chains are shops in a frim operating in multiple regions, but not all 11 regions, , Large Chains 
are shops in fiirms in all 11 regions.. 





1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003
521 25.22 29.27 0.40 0.39 0.59 0.53 12.17 14.98 25.22 29.27 64.29 64.07
522 6.28 6.75 0.43 0.40 0.61 0.55 3.82 4.25 6.28 6.75 12.38 11.75
524 6.46 7.54 0.44 0.40 0.61 0.55 3.89 4.43 6.46 7.54 11.98 14.02
528 9.47 9.20 0.48 0.45 0.63 0.58 4.81 5.28 9.47 9.20 27.01 21.08
Large Chains
1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003 1997/1998 2002/2003
521 72.45 56.82 0.43 0.51 0.61 0.67 31.14 22.51 72.45 56.82 140.52 117.52
522 6.09 5.93 0.52 0.41 0.65 0.54 3.94 3.94 6.09 5.93 8.77 9.04
524 11.58 13.44 0.37 0.30 0.57 0.47 6.72 7.54 11.58 13.44 23.22 29.36
528 8.83 8.58 0.37 0.35 0.60 0.52 4.85 4.96 8.83 8.58 27.04 19.50
Standard Deviation Percentage Small Percentage Small (emp  P25




TABLE 3. SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT WITHIN SMALL AND LARGE CHAINS
 
Notes:  Data for Chains. Small Chains are shops in a firm operating in multiple regions, but not all 11 regions, , Large Chains are shops in 
firms in all 11 regions.. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from ARD 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO)
Fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ln_N 0.2279*** 0.2793*** 0.2770*** 0.2746*** 0.2749*** 0.2744*** 0.2744*** 0.2767*** 0.2900***
Ln(Employment) (0.0101) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0277) (0.0286)
ln_K 0.0955*** 0.0555*** 0.0535*** 0.0527*** 0.0530*** 0.0525*** 0.0524*** 0.0534*** 0.0520***
ln(Capital) (0.0082) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0147)
ln_M 0.6581*** 0.5024*** 0.5026*** 0.5026*** 0.5023*** 0.5026*** 0.5025*** 0.5018*** 0.4883***
ln(Materials) (0.0150) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0406) (0.0410)
Nat Chain 0.0030 0.0727*** 0.0728*** 0.0708*** 0.0730*** 0.0710*** 0.0730*** 0.0744*** 0.0768***
National Chain dummy (0.0127) (0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0251) (0.0247) (0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0253)
ln_m_emp - - 0.0261*** - - 0.0070 0.0139 0.0274*** 0.0357***
ln(Stores median employment) (0.0095) (0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0123)
Pct_emp_small - - - - -0.0669*** - -0.0560*** - -
Percentage of employment in small stores (0.0198) (0.0211)
Pct_N_small - - - -0.0712*** - -0.0641*** - - -
Percentage of small stores (0.0193) (0.0223)
ln_iqr - - - ---- - 0.0035
ln(Interquantile range) (0.0058)
coeff - - - ---- 0.0086 -
Coefficient of variation (0.0105)
Observations 7469 7469 7469 7469 7469 7469 7469 7469 7088
R-squared 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TABLE 4. PRODUCTIVITY AND RETAIL STORES DISTRIBUTION
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 1997-2003. The dependent
variable in all columns is the log of gross output. All columns include year dummies and controls for region, age, multinational and multi-group status. All
columns except 1 include firm level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the reporting unit level to correct for heteroskedasticity of unknown
form. A national chain is defined as a retail firm which operates stores in all 11 UK GOR regions. Pct_emp_small and Pct_N_small are defined, respectively, as
the share of employment and the share of stores below firm level median employment in the first year the firm is observed. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO)
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector 521 522 524 Rest
ln_m_emp 0.0394*** -0.0187 0.0379*** 0.0022
ln(Stores median employment) (0.0106) (0.0320) (0.0142) (0.0156)
Pct_emp_small -0.0355 -0.0496 -0.0654*** -0.0258
Percentage of employment in small stores (0.0252) (0.0520) (0.0232) (0.0438)
Pct_N_small 0.0189 -0.0876 -0.0623** -0.0623
Percentage of small stores (0.0259) (0.0649) (0.0298) (0.0491)
Observations 1109 998 4292 1070
R-squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TABLE 5. INDUSTRY BREAKDOWN
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The time period is 1997-2003. Each line corresponds to a different
regressionThe dependent variable in all columns is the log of gross output. All columns include
year dummies and controls for capital, employment, materials, region, age, multinational and multi-
group status. All columns include firm level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets clustered at
the reporting unit level to correct for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. A national chain is
defined as a retail firm which operates stores in all 11 UK GOR regions. Pct_emp_small and
Pct_N_small are defined, respectively, as the share of employment and the share of stores below
firm level median employment in the first year the firm is observed.   
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO) ln(GO)
Fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
ln_N 0.2770*** 0.2746*** 0.2763*** 0.2765*** 0.2737*** 0.2737*** 0.2324***
Ln(Employment) (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0302)
ln_K 0.0535*** 0.0527*** 0.0532*** 0.0534*** 0.0523*** 0.0522*** 0.0624***
ln(Capital) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0117)
ln_M 0.5026*** 0.5026*** 0.5022*** 0.5021*** 0.5021*** 0.5019*** 0.5865***
ln(Materials) (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0433)
Nat Chain 0.0728*** 0.0708*** 0.0726*** 0.0721*** 0.0705*** 0.0709*** 0.0295
National Chain dummy (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0206)
ln_m_emp 0.0261*** - 0.0263*** 0.0280*** - - -
ln(Stores median employment) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0096)
Pct_N_small - -0.0712*** - - -0.0731*** -0.0680*** -0.0573***
Percentage of small stores (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0204) (0.0222)
Vt - - 0.0213** 0.0481* 0.0235** 0.0382* -
Vertical Integration Dummy (0.0106) (0.0288) (0.0106) (0.0222)
int_vt ----- - 0 . 0283 -
Vertical Integration*ln(Stores median employment) (0.0345)
int_vt_m - - - -0.0107 - - -
Vertical Integration*ln(Pct_n_small) (0.0106)
ln_T ------ 0 . 0030
ln(Transport costs) (0.0030)
Observations 7469 7469 7469 7469 7469 7469 5248
R-squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TABLE 6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The time period is 1997-2003. The dependent variable in
all columns is the log of gross output. All columns include year dummies and controls for region, age, multinational and multi-group status. All columns include firm
level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the reporting unit level to correct for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. A national chain is defined as a
retail firm which operates stores in all 11 UK GOR regions. Pct_emp_small and Pct_N_small are defined, respectively, as the share of employment and thes h a r eo f
stores below firm level median employment in the first year the firm is observed. The vertical integration dummy takes value 1 if the firm has establishments active in
the Wholesailing sector.  
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1 SIC 521 522 524 Rest Total
2 Industry weight 58.17% 3.25% 33.19% 5.38%
3 Weighted TFP growth -0.28% 0.10% 0.56% 0.84% 0.07%
4 Co-eff on log median employ 0.0394 -0.0197 0.0379 0.0022
5 Median employ, 1997/8 58.5 6.9 12.3 9.5
6 Median employ, 2002/3 49.7 7.3 14.2 10.0
7 Co-eff * change in median employ -0.64% -0.10% 0.54% 0.01%
Counterfactuals:
8 TFP growth, no change in med emp in 521 0.36% 0.10% 0.56% 0.84% 0.44%
9 TFP growth, no change in med emp all inds 0.36% 0.20% 0.02% 0.83% 0.27%
TABLE 7. GROWTH ACCOUNTING
 
Notes to Table: Data are for SICs shown with total the employment weighted sum of the rows, 
using employment weights in Row 2.  Row 4 is coefficient on median employment from Table 5.  
Growth rates are average annual growth rates between 1997 and 2003.  Numbers in row 7 do not 
correspond exactly to row 4 *(row 6 – row 5) due to rounding in rows 5 and 6.  Rows 8 is row 3 





                                                     
 
Appendix 1: Further information on the UK planning regime 
The basis for planning dates more or less from the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (1947).  
Any development of any land requires planning permission (there is much case law on what 
constitutes development).  Minor developments (e.g. small changes to a house) are assumed to 
have been granted permission.  Larger developments must ask for permission and decisions are 
based on whether the development fits with the applicable statutory development plan, a plan 
developed at local authority level.  Such plans were developed by a series of local bodies often 
overlapping.  A reform in 2004 decrees that the development plan for an area consists of a 
Regional Spatial Strategy, developed at the regional level (there are eight regions in England) 
and a “Local Development Framework” developed at local level but capable of being overruled 
by the Secretary of State.  Both plans are supposed to be open to consultation and the RSS is 
supposed to set out development goals over the 15-20 year period.  The Barker report suggests 
that an important aspect of local criteria is actually determined centrally since the Secretary of 
State issues Planning Policy Guidance Notes and Planning Policy Statements. 
Applications for development are subject to consultation with interested parties e.g. 
between developers and local authorities.  Pre-application discussions are common.  If 
permission is refused then applications can be re-heard centrally.  Large-scale applications e.g. 
new runways at airports if decided by the Secretary of State, are considered at a public inquiry. 
Turning specifically to retail, the Barker Interim report paragraphs 5.27ff, describes the 
specific changes.  In the 1980s out-of-town shopping locations was allowed relatively freely.  In 
response to a perceived loss of in-town retail market share, the 1996 Planning Policy Guidance 6 
was issued, stating the out-of-town centre locations should only be considered if town-centre or 
edge-of-centre locations had been ruled out.  It is interesting to note that this change effected a 
remarkable reversal in the decline in town-centre retail development: in 1971 around 65% of 
new floor space was constructed in town centres, falling to 23% in 1996 and rising to over 40% 
in 2003.  This is shown in the diagram below38   
 
 
38 Whether this assisted the social goals of maintaining town centres is discussed in the Barker report.  Retail 
presence is likely correlated with town centre wealth, but may not cause it, it may be the other way around.   
Pollution is lowered with out-of-centre shopping centres since a small fraction of private car journeys are actually 
for shopping and pollution from delivery lorries is increased in town centres.  
 
Source: Barker Interim Report.  
 
In March 2005 there was a change to this framework (Planning Policy Statement 6).  It is 
too early to assess its impact but it is potentially important with e.g. “a clear objective for local 
planning authorities to support efficient, competitive and innovative retail development – taking 
account of retail productivity; explicitly that larger stores may deliver benefits for consumers and 
that local planning authorities need to make provision where appropriate” (Barker Report para 
5.47).   
 
The interim Barker report contains an overview of UK planning and some detailed comments on 









 Appendix 2: Measuring retailing output and the relation between output and inputs39 
We believe there are at least three broad questions here.  First, what is the output of retailing that 
is of interest?  Second, how does what is actually measured relate to what we might wish to 
measure?  Third, how should we best judge how much the inputs have contributed to the output 
that we do measure? 
  The answer to the first question depends upon the research question, which here is 
typically as a first step to measuring productivity.   This is usually then answered by the 
conceptual point that the right output concept when considering productivity of, say a shoe 
retailer is not the shoes it sells but the bundle of retailing services it offers surrounding the sales 
of the shoes.
40  Such retail services are identified by Betancourt (2004, p.19ff) as ambience, 
product assortment, accessibility of location, assurance of delivery and information. If we had 
prices and quantities of these attributes then we could proceed, along with assumptions about the 
nature of competition.  However, these services are typically not priced directly (e.g. shops do 
not charge for entry).  So, this leads us to the second question of how to recover the value of 
such services from observable data which is typically on overall revenues and various input 
expenditures.  We cannot answer this until we have a theory of how the various inputs and 
outputs in retailing are related, which is also needed to answer the third question of how the 
various measured inputs explain/account for the measured outputs. 
  Regarding this question we have two subquestions: first, what are relevant inputs and 
outputs; second what, if any, restrictions can we place on the relation between the various inputs 
and the inputs and outputs that might allow us to deduce some of the relevant properties (output 
elasticities for example) from different output measures? To fix ideas, consider a shoe seller, 
where the measured output is sales of shoes.  What are the inputs?  A partial list might be the 
following.  First, the bought-in shoes themselves and second the shop (assuming it has a 
location).  Third, the factors enabling a transaction to be made (staff to open the shop and take 
the money, cash tills, heating and lighting etc.) and fourth the bundle of distribution services 
surrounding the sale of shoes in the shop; the location of the shop, the ambience in the shop (e.g. 
the lighting, design, quality of the staff), the reputation of the shop for e.g. accepting returned 
goods etc. Let us denote this real bundle of services under the vector D.  Define PQ as sales of 
goods at retail price P, PWQW as the value of goods purchased for resale at the wholesale price 
PW, other intermediate inputs used in retailing (lighting, electricity etc.) as PMM and primary 
factors labour and capital as PXX.  Our data are typically values of sales, PQ, and values of 
expenditures on measured inputs, PWQW , PMM and PXX
                                                     
.  Thus it is helpful in retailing to define 
three output measures: sales=PQ, gross margins PGMQGM =PQ-PWQW and value added PVQV 
=PQ-PWQW -PMM.  The most general form of a production function describing Q would be  
 
         ( 3 )   (, , ,) W QA F D QM X =
 
where A is a shift parameter.  An important question is what are the properties of PGMQGM =PQ-
PWQW, or more accurately, what are the marginal product properties from (3) observable from 
PGMQGM?  This question parallels the question in the production function literature on gross 
output versus value added, where the definition of value added is given, but the question of 
whether the properties of the gross output production function are recoverable from the value 
 
39 This question is discussed in, for example, Betancourt (2002), Oi (1981) and Triplett and Bosworth (2003). 
40 
 
40 This follows from the generic argument that retailers offer fundamentally intermediation activities in the same 
way that a business who transports shoes from A to B does not produce the shoes, but the bundle of transport 
services surrounding the shoes.   added production function depends on the underlying form of the former.  That literature 
suggests the conditions under which is can be done are that either that Q takes a special 
functional form so that the ratio of QW to Q is fixed (either technologically, or that relative factor 
prices do not change) or that QW is separable from the other inputs so that (3) can be written as:  
 
          ( 4 )   ((, , ) , ) W QF A D M X Q =
 
As Triplett and Bosworth (2004) point out, separability means that the elasticity of substitution 
between D, M or X and QW  is zero, or that retailers choose QW and then choose to allocate M 
and X independently of the choice of QW.  As Oi (2000) and Triplett and Bosworth (2004) point 
out, this is increasingly unlikely in retailing.  For example, bikes used to be sold fully assembled, 
whereas now they are sold flat packed giving customers the choice to assemble the bikes 
themselves or have the shop do it.  Thus there has been a change in QW and this has necessitated 
a change in the ratio of M and X (in this case where X is the number of persons working at the 
store)
41.  In sum, if separability does not hold, then TFP growth calculated from (4) will not give 
the same information as (3).  This suggests that we should base our production function 
estimates on gross output and not margins. 
A number of points are worth making.  First, our assumption here that the distribution 
services, D are an input into final sales, Q follows other papers, see e.g. Ofer (1973)
42 and 
Triplett and Bosworth (2004).  Ofer (1973, pp.367) posits a separable production function of the 
form Q=F(A,D,M,X)+Qw on the assumption that consumers decide upon the ratio between sales 
and services produced (by choice of shop type).
 43  So the relation between final sales and bought 
in goods for resale is uninfluenced, he assumes, by input prices or technology.  It has the 
interesting implication, also stressed by Betancourt (2004) and Oi (1992), that consumers are 
thus implicitly an input into the a retailer’s output; if one of the elements of D for example is the 
full or self-service provided to a consumer, then the consumer’s time is an input into retail 
production.  This provides a framework to post the question of whether the shift from full to self-
service has affected retail productivity.
44 
Second, Betancourt (2004) assumes that both Q and D are joint outputs of a retailing 
firm, in which case the profit function is the appropriate estimation vehicle.  By contrast, this 
framework assumes that D is an input into Q.  We make this because it is hard to imagine a 
consumer who could have Q without D or who could order D by itself without Q.  Consider 
Amazon.com where Q is the sales of books and D is the delivery and the website.  Consumers 
cannot meaningfully order books without having them delivered, nor ask for the delivery alone.  
Consumers, like in retail stores, could of course “window” shop, but then there is no meaningful 
output (and this is likely a case where D is an input into future Q).  One might however ask how 
we can argue that D is the appropriate output of retailers, but then argue that it is an input.  The 
answer is that it is analogous to the distinction between output and value added in 
manufacturing.  The output of a baker can be regarded as loaves of bread or value added in 
baking.  However, value added in baking can also be regarded as an input into the gross output 
of loaves of bread (along with other inputs like flour) with the precise relation depending on 
41 
 
                                                       
41 So in the case of fully assembled bikes, QW is the quantity of fully-assembled bikes and X is small.  In the case of 
flat packed, QW is less but X is larger if the store employs more workers to assemble the bikes. 
42 “Sales may be looked upon as being produced from two inputs- goods purchased and services produced”, p.367. 
In turn Ofer regards services produced as being determined by factor inputs. 
43 So for example, to sell 20 pairs of shoes one has to buy in for final resale 20 pairs of shoes, a Leontief relation 
fixed over time, but consumers decide whether they want to buy the shoes in a full service, well decorated shop etc. 
44 It might for example have raises measured sales, but may not have raised D. 42 
 
                                                     
separability conditions.  Or value added in baking can, under some assumptions, be used to 
recover the output elasticities of various factors with respect to total output. 
  Finally, if competition is perfect and there are no economies of scale we would expect 
free entry to mean that real margins will just reflect the cost of distribution services provided 
(which in turn might consist of e.g. higher payments to staff).  Thus the nominal value of D, even 
though unpriced, would be recoverable from a manipulation of measurables.
45  The real value of 
D however is more difficult, not least because deducing it from the real value of sales less the 
real value of bought-in goods for resale would require deducing a relatively small number from 
the subtraction of two very large numbers, both of which are likely measured with error (the real 
value of bought-in goods for example would have to reflect company-specific discounts).  Thus 
in practice the compliers of National Accounts are unwilling to use the real value of margins as 
the output measure, even though using the real value of sales raises similar issues of 
measurement and lack of deflators. 
  Finally, a discussion and summary of results on retailing productivity using industry data 




45 And this would in turn be determined by the level D that retailers provide.  Such information, on for example, 
ambience, is hard to measure; Betancourt (2004) suggests using store-level consumer surveys. 